Application of Game Theory by Jeter, Gerald Wayne
AN APPLICATION OF GAME THEORY 
By 
GERALD WAYNE JETER 
" 
Associate of Science 
Murray State Agricultural College 
Tishomingo, Oklahoma 
1961 
Bachelor of Science 
Oklahoma State University 
Stillwater, Oklahoma 
1964 
Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of the Oklahoma State University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
May, 1965 

AN APPLICATION OF GAME THEORY 
Thesis Approved: 
~8 1 '->'~ 5 :. Q.c _ .u~ , 
ii 
PREFACE 
Game theory, a mathematical model providing a method 
for the study of decision making in situations of conflict, 
has laid the foundation for a eystematic and penetrating 
treatment of a vast range of problems in the social sci-
ences, mili tar·y operations, statistics, and industry. 
While game theory is generally well known to the mathema-
tician and statistician, practical applications have been 
relatively meager. It is the purpose of this thesis to 
utilize game theory in presenting an approach, application, 
and solution to a problem which confronts decision makers 
involved in the game of football; that of strat·egy 
optimization. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTS AND TERMINOLOGY 
One of the most vexing and persistent problems of an 
individual in any conflicting situation is that of out 
guessing his rivalo If only he co~ld calculate in advance 
what the competition was going to do~ his planning would be 
far easier and more effective. Obviously, the simplest ap-
proach is applicable where experience with the behavior of 
a competitor makes it relatively easy to predict his strat-
egies. Where such information is available, it is possible 
to choose that decision which maximizes the individual's 
expected gain or return after the effects of his rival's 
countermoves are taken into consideration. However, it is 
often against the competitor's interest to permit this sort 
of analysis in order to avoid a too obvious pattern in his 
decision making. 
It is also possible to approach the analysis of com= 
petitive behavior by a more deductive route. Instead of 
asking, inductively, what can be inferred from a competi-
tor's past behavior, one seeks to determine a rival's most 
profitable counterstrategy to one's own II best" moves and to 
formulate the appropriate defensive measures. This is the 
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approach on which game theory has been adopted (1). 
Game theory, usually considered to have originated in 
the late 1920's with the mathematician, J. Von Neumann, is 
a method for the study of decision making in situations of 
conflict. It deals with problems in which the individual 
decision ma:ker is not in complete control of the factors 
influencing the outcome of the conflict. Politicians, in-
dustrialists~ bandits, and bridge players are all involved 
in struggles which may be classified as game situations (2)o 
The essence of a game problem i.s that it involves individ-
uals or groups of individuals with different goals or ob-
jectives whose fates are interlockedo 
A game is described in terms of the participants or 
decision makers, the rules of the game, the payoffs or out-
comes of the game~ the valuation that the participants 
assign to various payoffs~ the variables that each player 
controls, and the information conditions that exist during 
the game. These elements~ common to all conflicting situa-
tions, are the building blocks of game theory. They play 
the same role in game theory as do particles and forces in 
a theory of mechanics (2). 
As is the case in any presentation of this nature, 
terminology plays an important role in clearing the path 
for a better understanding of game theory. It is impera-
tive that the following terms be defined in a precise man-
ner to avoid misrepresentation and to provide for a more 
lucid understanding of the subject. 
Game Th~.Q!l:= A mathematical model providing a 









A generic term incorporating conflict 
si tuat:ions where opposing players at-
tempt to achieve their objectives in 
relation to a predetermined collec-
tion o.f rules • 
. ,
A yield or result which indicates the 
success of a player's action. 
Any particular instance of a game. 
A game involving two distinct entities 
where the motives of the participants 
are dichotomized: payoff is neither 
created nor destroyed~ but a partici-
pant's gain is his opponent's loss. 
An action or group of actions which a 
player pursues in an effort to opti-
mize his own payoff. The choice of 
strategy is based on the supposition 
that the opponents are of equal in~ 
telligence and each continually takes 
appropriate action to prevent the 
other from achieving his objective. 
In repeated plays 9 a participant 
selects one and the same strategy 










A varied choice of strategy from 
one play of the game to the other o 
An autonomous decision making game 
participar.L"t who attempts to obtain 
his objective. 
A mathematical expression of a game 
where one player's alternatives are 
arranged vertically in columns~ and 
·the other player's alternatives are 
arranged horizontally in rowso Pay-
off values are assigned or computed 
for each intersection in the matrix. 
A general payoff matrix is illus-
trated in Figure 1. 
In thi.s game, P1 has "m" strategy 
alternatives and P2 had "n" strategy 
alternatives. When P1 chooses A1 
and P2 chooses B1 , then P1 will re-
ceive a11 and P2 will receive -a11 
( 3). 
A situation where one row or column 
is superior to another row or column 
in every instance. 
The expected yield or payoff which 
will be realized by each player if 
he pursues an optimum strategy de= 
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Figure 1. General Payoff Matrix 
matrix. The ex:pec·ted payoff will be 
unfavorable to that player which 
deviates from the optimal strategy 
dictated by the solution. 
§addle PoiB1: A payoff value which exhibits the 
unique property of being the lowest 
"Value. in its row and the highest 
value in its column. If a saddle 
point exists, it is the value of the 
game and the players' optimal strat-
egies are pure strategies. 
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Mathematically sound, game theory has several primary 
limitations: its lack of familiarity and, consequently, 
its lack of application to situations where it could be of 
significant value, its difficulty in attempting to quantify 
the relationships between competitors which are often sub-
jective in nature, and the assignment of game values to the 
payoff matrix which depend on just a single parameter. 
As a guide to decision making, game theory is in its 
infancy, but it enjoys a rather vigorous and promising fu-
ture if utilized in applicable situations by individuals 
who possess a thorough understanding of its inherent limi-
tations and advantages. 
Statement of the Problem 
In an effort to apply game theory to a real-life situ-
ation, this thesis is concerned with the application of 
7 
game theory· to athletic endeavor; specifically, the game of 
football. 
The game of football was chosen for game theory analy-
sis for two primary reasons: (1) Football lends itself 
well to an analysis of this nature since the success of a. 
maneuver is readily gauged in yards gained or lost and can 
be appropriately entered into a payoff matrix, and (2) the 
author's special interest in this area generated by pre-· 
vious experience as a participant in collegiate football. 
This study will concern itself with an analysis of of-
fensive and defensive maneuvers of a hypothetical team~ 
team A, which endeavors to optimize its strategies in rela-
tion to those of an opponent's. The problems involved in 
an analysis of this nature will be the development of a 
payoff matrix which will realistically portray the existing 
relationship between the hypothetical team and its opponent~ 
the generation of data to be used for payoff values, and a 
mathematical solution to the matrix to determine the value 
of the game and the optimum mixed strategy. 
Scope of the Problem 
Obviously, there are many factors which will alter and 
affect a team's choice of offensive and defensive maneuvers 
and strategies in any given instance during a football con-
test. Among these are: the opposing team's personnel, 
climate conditions 9 time remaining in the contest, the 
present score~ immediate II down and yards to go" situation~ 
and field positiono It becomes readily apparent that no 
reasonable mathematical model could encompass all of the 
diverse variables present at any given instant in a foot-
ball contest. For this reason~ a generalized game situa-
tion will be pursued for the purposes of this analysis. 
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The study will progress by assuming a hypothetical contest 
is to be played with the following conditions and restramts 
prevailing: 
1. Climatic and field conditions are consistent. 
2. Time remaining in the contest will play no 
role in offensive and defensive decision 
making. 
;. The score at any particular instant is assumed 
to be approximately even. 
4. Both offensive and defensive teams will oper-
ate under the assumption that immediate 10 down 
and yards to go II situations are favorable to 
the extent that standard maneuvers are involved 
in the analysis. This eliminates punting, 
field goal attempts, and "desperation°' maneuvers 
of any sort. 
5. Field position favors neither team with respect 
to field length nor breadth. 
CHAPTER II 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Assume that a collegiate football team, team A, is 
busily preparing for a contest with its arch-rival, team B. 
During the past few contests, team A has shown signs of 
both offensive and defensive strength, but a study of pre-
vious game statistics and films indicate that far too many 
offensive and defensive strategies were poorly chosen and 
grossly inappropriate to the situation. In general, team A 
has frequently been outguessed and, consequently, many ma-
neuvers have been directed at the stronger aspects of the 
opposition. The problem is critical and must be resolved 
before the game with team B. A thorough analysis of offen-
sive and defensive decision making appears to be imperative 
if team A is to win the game. 
Analysis of Offense 
Primarily, team A operates offensively from a basic 
split-T formation with a few minor variations. Offensive 
play patterns may be broken down into the following basic 
categories: 
1. Inside Runnigg (fast developing): This category 
of play is utilized with little or no deception 
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in which the success of the play depends entirely 
upon speed. Included in this category are dives, 
"belly" series, slants, sneaks, and counterplays. 
2. Inside Running (slow developing): The success of 
these plays depends primarily upon deception. 
This category includes draws and trap plays. 
3. Outside Running: Speed plays an important role 
in the success of this category of plays. This 
category includes pitch-outs and running options. 
4. Outside Power: The success of these plays 
depends upon quantity and quality of blocking. 
This category includes pitch-backs and wide 
slants. 
5. Deep Pass Pattern~: Very slow developing plays 
are included in this category of passing varia-
tions. Surge and option patterns are among the 
patterns in this categoryo 
6. Short Pass Patterns: Extremely quick developing 
passes such as "look-ins" and hooks are included 
in this category. 
In an effort to better prepare team A's offense, team 
B's defensive alignments have been scouted extensively. 
Scouting reports indicate that they will align defensively 
in the following basic formations: 
1. 4-4-3. This pro-type defense features excellent 
pass protection and curtailment of outside running 
but sacrifices the inside running play. 
2. 5-4-2. A fundamental split-T defense, this 
alignment is rather weak on passes 1 but strong 
against all types of running plays. 
3. 6-3-2. This defense is rather weak in pass 
patterns. 
4. 8-3· This short yardage defense is notoriously 
weak on passes, but defends well against most 
running plays. 
5. 7-1-2-1. A defense which performs well against 
most running plays and certain pass patterns. 
6. 6-2-3. This alignment defends well against the 
long pass patterns, but is often weak on out-
side running plays. 
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Further study of team B's defensive alignments reveal 
that they employ the same fundamental defenses that have 
been utilized by many other previous opponents. It would 
appear that an analysis of films and statistics from pre-
vious games could certainly give an indication of A's abil-
ity to move the ball against B's defense and might reveal 
the relative frequency which an offensive maneuver should 
be employed. 
After an intensive study of films, reports 9 and sta-
tistics from prior games, the average number of yards gained 
or lost with a specific category of offensive maneuver em-
ployed against a specific type of defensive alignment may 
be compiled. This information can be summarized in a pay-
off matrix which tabulates what the offense will receive in 
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actual yards gained or lost as a result of each possible 
combination of offensive play choice and defensive align-
ment choice. .Arranged in a gene.ral pa.yo.ff matrix, the data 
appears in Figure 2. 
A solution to this two-person~ zero-sum general payoff 
matrix will reveal the game value: the expected yield to 
be realized if an optimum strategy mix is pursued, and the 
relative frequency which each offensive category should be 
employed: the optimum strategy mix. 
Analysis of Defense 
Defensive strategy like offensive strategy may be ana-
lyzed effectively by utilization of game theory. Similar 
to offensive analysis, a quantification of the success of a 
specific defensive maneuver utilized against a specific of-
fensive maneuver is necessary. Again, this is accomplished 
by a study of films, statistics, and all available informa-
tion pertaining to previous contests where the competitors 
employed offensive strategy similar to that which the im-
mediate opponent is expected to utilize. Assume that the 
basic defensive alignments and offensive play patterns enu-
merated previously and used by both teams are, therefore, 
applicable in defensive as well as offensive analysis. 
A study of the available sources reveal the average 
number of yards which A's defensive team has given up or 
driven back the previ·ous opposition's offense. Summarized 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) egy 
(1) 6 2 0 -3 -2 2 
(2) 1 0 -2 -1 0 -2 
(3) -2 2 3 0 3 2 
A Offense 
(4) 4 -5 7 1 -4 -3 
(5) 0 6 0 8 0 6 
(6) 1 3 3 -4 2 0 
Figure 2. Offensive Analysis Payoff Matrix 
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Figure 3. It will be noted that although offensive and de-
fensive strategies are identical, the payoff values differ 
from those in Figure 2. 
A solution to this two-per.son, zero-sum general payoff 
matrix will reveal the game value and the relative frequency 
which A's defensive team should employ a specific alignment 




egy (l) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) 0 3 2 1 -2 1 
( 2) 1 =2 2 1 0 2 
( 3) 3 1 -1 3 0 1 
B Offense 
(4) 2 5 0 -2 7 -5 
(5) -3 -1 4 0 4 3 
(6) -4 0 6 5 4 8 
Figure 3. Defensive Analysis Payoff Matrix 
CHAPTER III 
DETERMINATION OF SOLUTION 
Several methods exist for finding the solution to two-
person, zero-sum games. These include trial and error 
solutions, graphical techniques, linear programming, matrix 
solutions, fictitious play solution, and algebraic solutior£. 
For the purposes of this study, two methods of solution will 
be illustrated. The general payoff matrix relating to the 
offensive analysis will be solved by employing a fictitious 
play solution,and the general payoff matrix involved in the 
defensive analysis will be solved by a linear programming 
technique. 
Before attempting to solve any payoff matrix, it is 
useful to take two preliminary steps. First, a check should 
be made for existence of a saddle pointo Second, certain 
alternatives may be eliminated by checking for dominance, 
thus reducing the size of the payoff matrix (3). 
Offensive Solution 
After checking the matrix illustrating the relation-
ship between A's offense and B's defense in Figure 2 (page 
13) for a saddle point and dominance, the matrix is ready 
for solution by fictitious play. The method of finding a 
16 
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solution by fictitious play is based on a hypothetical 
series of consecutive plays of a game~ In the first play, 
one player chooses an alternative at random, thereby forcing 
·the o·ther player to choose an alternative which will opti-
mize his expected payoff in relation to the first player's 
initial choice. Figure 4 illustrates fictitious play of 
the payoff matrix associated with the offensive analysis as 
shown in Figure 2. The first play results in totals 2, O, 
2, -5, 6, 3 for A's offense of which 6 (starred) is the 
optimal payoff since 6 > 3 > 2 > 0 > -·5· The first play totals 
for B's defense result in O, 6, O, 8, O, 6 of which one of 
the zero values is chosen at random as B's optimal payoff, 
since O < 6 < 8. In succeeding plays, the payoffs are the 
result of total payoffs based on past plays. 
It will be noted that the value of the game always 
lies between the highest average payoff to B's defense and 
the lowest average payoff to A's offense. In Figure 4, 
after ten iterations, the highest average payoff to B's de-
fense occurred in fictitious play 8 and is 5;s. The lowest 
payoff to A's offense occurred in play 10 and is 13;5. 
Hence, after ten iterations, the value of the game, U0 , is 
.625 < U < 1.60. 
0 
By increasing the number of plays, the range within which 
U0 lies can be decreased to any desired accuracy. After 
A Offense 
B Defense 
Strat~ (1) (2)!(3) (4) (5) 
' egy I 
I I 
<1> I 6 2 0 -3 -2 
(2) 1 0 -2 -1 0 
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twenty-five iterations, the game value, U0 , is 
and, after fifty iterations, the game value, U0 , is 
.809 < uo < 1.0. - -
An estimate of the optimal strategy mix can also be 
derived from the fictitious play solution by determining 
the relative frequency of which an alternative is chosen. 
Figure 4 illustrates that after ten iterations play cate-
gory (1) was chosen 1 time out of 10, play category (3) was 
chosen 3 times out of 10, play category (5) was chosen 4 
- times out of 10, play category (6) was chosen 2 times out 
of 10, and play categories (2) and (4) were not utilized. 
Hence, the estimated relative frequency indicates that in 
order for the offensive team to achieve an optimal expected 
payoff, play category (1) should be employed at random 10 
per cent of the time, play category (3) employed at random 
30 per cent of the time, etc. Again, by increasing the 
number of play iterations, a better estimate of the optimal 
strategy mix may be obtained. After fifty play iterations, 
the optimal strategy mix indicates that play category (1) 
should be employed at random 16 per cent of the time; cate-
gory (3), 24 per cent; category (5), 32 per cent; category 
(6), 28 per cent; and categories (2) and (4), 6 per cent. 
Any deviation from the optimal strategy mix will result in 
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a diminished game value or expected payoff. 
Defensive Solution 
After checking the payoff matrix illustrating A's de-
fense in relation to B's offense in Figure 3 (page 15) for 
a saddle point and dominance, the matrix may be transformed 
into a linear programming problem and solved .for a game 
value and optimal strategy mix using the simplex method of 
linear programming. 
It will be observed in Figure 3 that some of the pay-
off values within the matrix have negative signs. To con-
vert the defensive analysis matrix into linear programming'! 
a constant 1 6, will be added to all payoff values in Figure 
3 resulting in a payoff matrix shown in Figure 5 (4). 
If the value of the game of Figure 5 is g o' and the 
value of the game of Figure 3 is uo, then the following 
relationship exists: 
It should be noted that the optimal strategies of the 
players are not affected when a constant is added to all 
elements of the payoff matrix. 
(1) 
Let x1 , x 2 , x3 , x4 , x 59 x6 be the relative frequencies 
associated with the optimal strategy mix and the utiliza-
tion of defensive alignments (1) 9 (2)~ (3)~ (4)~ (5) 9 (6)~ 
re spec ti vely. Also, let n g u be some value. The optimal 
relative frequency and the game value may be found if the 
21 
A Defense 
Strat- ( 1) ( 2) ( 3) (4) (5) (6) egy 
(1) 6 9 8 7 4 7 
( 2) 7 4 8 7 6 8 
( 3) 9 7 5 9 6 7 
B Offense 
(4) 8 11 6 4 13· 1 
(5) 3 5 10 6 10 9 
(6) 2 6 12 11 10 14 
Figure 5. Revised Defensive Analysis Payoff Matrix 
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following functional constraints are satisfied: 
6x1 + 9x2 + 8x3 + 7x4 + 4x5 + 7x6 ~ g (2) 
?xl + 4x2 + 8x3 + 7x4 + 6x5 + 8x6 ~- g ( 3) 
9x1 + 7x2 + 5x3 + 9x4 + 6x5 + 7x6 ~ g (4) 
8x1 + llx2 + 6x3 + 4x4 + 13x5 + x6 2:. g (5) 
3x1 + 5x2 + 10x3 + 6x4 + 10x5 + 9x6 ~ g (6) 
2x1 + 6x2 + 12x3 + llx4 + 10x5 + 14x6 ,: go (7) 
Since x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 , x5 , and x6 are relative frequencies, 
one also finds that 
xl + x2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 = 1. (8) 
Since g 0 is positive, each of the inequations can be divided 
by "g" without affecting the corresponding inequations for 
the solution sought. This results in: 
6x1;g + 
x x X4 X5 x 
9 1g+ 8 3;g + 7 ;g + 4 /g + 7 ~g > 1 (9) 
x x x X4 x x 
7 1/g + 4 1g+ 8 3;g + 7 ;g + 6 5;g + 8 ~g > 1 (10) 
x x x X4 x x 
9 1;g + 7 1g + 5 3;g + 9 ;g + 6 5;g + 7 ~g > 1 (11) 
xl x2 X3 X4 x5 x6 
8 ,g + 11 jg+ 6 /"g + 4 ;g + 13 /"g + /g > 1 (12) 
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··x x x x x x 
3 l;g + 5 2;g + 10 3;g + 6 ~ g + '. 10 5; g + 14 6;g > 1 · (13) 
-
x x x x x x 
2 =yg + 6 ~g + 12 3;g + 11 ~ g + 10 5; g + 14 6;g · > 1 
u1 , u2, u3 , u4, u5 , u6, and Z are now defined such 
that: 
x 
ul = l;g 
x 
u2 = ~g 
x 





U5 = 5;g 
x 
u6 = 6;g 














9U1 + 7U 2 + 5U 3 + 9U4 + 6U5 + 7u6 > 1 (25) 
8U1 + 11U2 + 6U 3 + 4U4 + 13U5 + u6 > 1 (26) -
3U1 + 5U2 + lOU 3 + 6U4 + lOU5 + 9U6 > 1 (27) -
2U1 + 6U 2 + 12U; + 11U4 + lOU; + 14U6 > 1 (28) -
u1 + u2 + u3 + u4 + u5 + u6 = Zo 
A's defensive team is interested in as low a game 
value~ g0 ~ as possible since it attempts to stymie B's of-
fensive effort to gain yards. Thus, B's defense must mini-
mize g or maximize Z. 
In Equations (23) to (29)~ a linear programming problem 
is represented. One has to find u 1 , u 2 , u3 , u4 , u 5 , and u6 
which satisfy Equations (23) to (28) that maximizes Zin 
Equation (29). Using linear programming techniques (a sim-
plex solution) and the facilities of the 1620 computer, the 
following solution is obtained: 
u1 :::: .0617 u2 = .0145 u3 = 00530 
U4 = .0000 U5 - .0015 u6 .0099 
z = .1406. u 
Therefore, by Equations (16) through (22), 
xl = .4388 x2 = .1031 x3 .3770 
X4 = .0000 X5 .0107 x6 = .0704 
go = 7.1124. 
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From Equation (1) 
U O ·- 1 • 1124 . 
From this solu·tion, .it j.s seen ·bhat the optimal strategy 
mix for A's defense to utilize against B's defense is to 
randomly employ defensive alignment ( 1) 44 per ce:ri:t; of the 
time, (2) 10 per cent of the time, (3) 38 per cent of the 
time, (4) 0 per cent of the time~ (5) 1 per cent of the 
t:i.me ~ and ali.gnment (6) 7 per cent of the time. If A's 
defensive team pursues this optimal strategy mix, they may 
expect to give up an average value of 1.1124 yards each 
time B's offense attempts to move the ball. 
In discussing the solution to a gaming matrix~ two 
methods of determining the game value and optimal strategy 
have been discussed. Both methods have merit and are 
equally c.apable of solving a gaming matrix. However, there 
are certain advantages which each method may possess over 
the other in particular situations. 
The simplex method of linear programming offers a very 
reliable and exact solution to the payoff matrix, but is 
tedious and rather complicated in comparison to a solution 
by fictitious play. The desirability of attempting a solu-
tion by linear programming may depend upon the knowledge 
and availability of a computer which can easily solve a 
matrix of considerable size. 
A fictitious play solution~ on the other handj can be 
performed by one with only an elementary knowledge of 
fundamental arithmetic, but does not offer the accuracy 
which a linear programming solution affords. Also, while 
easy to solve by fictitious play, a large matrix may be 
qui.te tedious if carried out more than a few iterations e 
The same is true, however, of hand solutions to large 
matrices by the simplex method. 
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Hence, the desire for exactness, ease of solution, and 
avai.labili ty of a computer are all factors which must be 
considered in the choice of solution to a gaming matrixo 
A considerable amount of time and effort may be saved if an 
initial proper choice is made. 
CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Game theory to date is still primarily a field of pure 
theory. Applications have been few in number and limited 
in scope because of the unmanageable complexities that 
arise once the number of participants exceed two and the 
rules allow more than trivial freedom of action (3). 
Game theory used as a tool to quantify the game of 
football is grossly inadequate in a great number of cases. 
Poor player morale, a muddy field, and a strong wind are 
obviously elements which will alter and affect the outcome 
of a game, but which cannot be readily accounted for in any 
mathematical modelo These are things which limit the scope 
and value of any study of this nature. However, if viewed 
in proper perspective,game theory can be of significant 
value if it is considered to be a guide rather than dogma 
to a decision maker's actions. For example, if a solution 
to a payoff matrix, using previous game statistics as payoff 
values, instructs one to employ a certain defense only one 
per cent of the time, this may be an indication that the 
defense has been poorly coached or perhaps incorrectly 
carried out. A coach may note that game theory analysis 
reveals that a certain play should be run only five per cent 
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of the time. This may be an indication of poor timing or 
incorrec·t execution and faking if this play is used suc-
cessfully by other teams. Examples, such as these, are in-
dicative of the "common sense" approach which should be 
taken toward game theory and its use. 
Randomization of maneuvers, as dictated by the optimal 
strategy mix, is another facet· of game theory which should 
be clearly understood and viewed in proper perspective. 
Obviously, the offensive and defensive signal callers can-
not be expected to roll dice or carry a table of random 
numbers in order to achiev·e pure randomization of play se-
lection. A general awareness of the game situation, the 
element of surprise, and inappropriateness of a maneuver 
are all factors which may outweigh the dictates of a random 
selection. Again, a common sense approach is essential if 
game theory is to be of value as a guide to decision making. 
To one who understands the worth of game theory and 
yet realizes its inherent limitations, it is possible to 
gain insight into a multitude of situations which might not 
otherwise be readily apparent. It, obviously, is not the 
answer to all problems involving competing entities and 
should not be treated as such, but this ~~ct alone does not 
mean that total abandonment is justified. If used ration-
ally, it can be a most promising and powerful analytical 
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